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LEGAL GROWTH THROUGH EVOLUTION 
COMMENT ON THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 
AND ENGLISH LAW 
W. HAMILTON BRYSON* 
Professor Harold Berman has presented the fascinating thesis 
that a people's religion influences their laws and that the Puritan 
religious revolution of seventeenth century England introduced 
Calvinist ideas into Anglo-American jurisprudence. I fully agree with 
Professor Berman's observations that religious beliefs and a sense of 
moral obligation to others are some of the motivations of, or at least 
influences upon, legal growth. Economic aggrandizement is not the 
only motivation of the human race. Religion has had a direct effect 
upon social and political institutions. 
On the other hand, Professor Berman's arguments as to the 
specific relation of Calvinism and English legal development do not 
always convince. His discussion of Calvinist theology is very in-
teresting, but it seems that the ideas that he takes to be tenets of 
Calvinism that he finds in English law were there before Puritanism 
took hold of England and that the development of the law in the seven-
teenth century in England, even when done by Puritans, was indepen-
dent of theological doctrine. 
It is stated that between 1640 and 1689 "[p]arliamentary 
supremacy was established." While it is true that the power of Parlia-
ment was greatly increased in this period, it is going too far to ignore 
the fact that the leaders of the parliamentary party were building 
with ideas firmly established before Calvin's influence reached 
England. It was accepted without question in medieval England that 
the consent of Parliament was absolutely necessary for taxation. In 
1534, the same year that Calvin broke with Roman Catholicism, Henry 
VIII felt that he must have the consent of Parliament to remove the 
English Church from the authority of the pope.1 The English Refor-
mation was done by acts of Parliament not royal decree.2 Without 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond, B.A., 1963, Hampden·Sydney 
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1. 26 Hen. VIII (1534), ch. 1, 3 STAT. REALM, 492. 
2. See generally S. E. LEHMBERG, THE REFORMATION PARLIAMENT 1529·1536 
(1970). 
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debating the influence of Puritanism ~uring the generation of the 
Restoration, 1660 to 1689, it is clear that Parliament was not supreme 
in 1689. While it is true that Parliament called William and Mary to 
the Throne, William III did not accede to all of the demands of Parlia-
ment; for example, the Bill of Rights of 16883 did not require that 
judges be appointed quamdiu se bene gesserint, as was desired. 4 Queen 
Anne vetoed a bill in 1707.5 It was not until the mid eighteenth cen-
tury at the earliest that the majority party in Parliament could exer-
cise the royal prerogative against the will of the king. George III had 
to be cajoled into receiving a personally unacceptable -ministry, that 
of Fox and North in 1783. Even Queen Victoria had to be reminded 
by Gladstone that, though she was the queen, he represented the 
people of England. In the light of Pride's Purge in 1648 when Oliver 
Cromwell's political opponents were expelled from Parliament and of 
the government appointment rather than the popular election of the 
Parliament in 1653, it appears that parliamentary supremacy was not 
part of the Puritan religious philosophy. In this respect, Cromwell 
was not much of an improvement over Charles I. (Nor was the use 
of the Puritan Army to collect taxes better than the forced loans of 
Cromwell's royal predecessor.) 
Professor Berman argues that "[t]he newer courts that had been 
created by the Tudor kings were abolished, and the older common-
law courts became supreme over all." It is true that in 1640 the courts 
of Star Chamber and High Commission were abolished and the jurisdic-
tions of the Council of the Marches of Wales and the Council of the 
North were greatly curtailed,6 but the equity jurisdictions of the latter 
two courts continued to exist. These latter two courts and the Court 
of Requests slowly faded away after 1640 because of the political tur-
moil into which England was plunged by the Civil War. The common 
law judges had some thirty years before 1640, and for political not 
theological reasons, used the writ of prohibition to cut back the ec-
clesiastical and admiralty courts.7 But the Court of Chancery had 
escaped all attacks. In spite of the opprobrium of Selden and other 
anti-royalists and in spite of a wild proposal to abolish it, the Court 
of Chancery flourished under the Commonwealth and the Protectorate; 
3. 1 W. & M. (1688), sess. 2, ch. 2, 6 STAT. REALM 1:42-45. 
4. This statute, though an important step, failed to address many of the pro· 
blems of the previous two reigns: J.P. KENYON, STUART ENGLAND 260·64 (1978). 
5. 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 518-19 (4th ed. by Hailsham 1980). 
6. 16 Car. I (1640) ch. 10, §§ 1, 2, 7, and ch. 11, 5 STAT. REALM 110-13. 
7. J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 107-09, 112, 124-25 
(1979). 
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it continued to grow in strength and jurisdiction after the Restora-
tion in 1660, as it had before. Except in the area of criminal law, the 
equity jurisdictions of the Chancery and the Exchequer were at least 
equal to the courts of common law. Moreover, it can be forcefully 
argued that they were supreme over the common law in that a court 
of equity could enjoin the enforcement of a common law judgment 
that was contrary to the established principles of equity. Not only 
was a judgment obtained through fraud to be suppressed in equity, 
practically speaking, but a common law mortgage would be relieved 
against and a trust would be enforced, though the common law courts 
refused to recognize the legal obligation of a trust. Equitable defenses 
could be asserted against common law obligations. In the areas of con-
tract law and property, where equity and common law clashed, equity 
rules prevailed. 
The English judges did not achieve life tenure in the seventeenth 
century. The salutary concept of judicial independence from political 
pressures had existed in England long before Calvin wrote,8 and in 
the seventeenth century, it was believed that if the judges held of-
fice with a secure tenure, (i.e. quamdiu se bene gesserint, "so long as 
they acted properly") and not at the whim of the king, independence 
would be achieved. The Long Parliament in 1641, prevailed upon 
Charles I to appoint the judges to sit with secure tenure.9 This was 
done by him and his successors until 1668. But it is to be noted that 
Oliver Cromwell removed Chief Baron Wilde from office in 1653 and 
Baron Thorpe in i655. Charles II in 1668, following the end of the 
influence of the earl of Clarendon (who was not a Puritan) refused 
any longer to appoint judges with secure tenure. Charles II and James 
II attempted to manipulate the courts through changing the judges 
who sat there. · 
After the explusion of James II, it was attempted to force 
William III to appoint judges with secure tenure. Although he and 
his successor, Queen Anne did do so, it was as a matter of his free 
will, and he vetoed a bill in 1692 which would have required it. 
However, in 1701, William III was forced to yield up this royal 
prerogative in return for the passage of the Act of Settlement (which 
was necessary to keep the English Crown on protestant heads, which 
was necessary to keep Catholic France from annexing the 
Netherlands). But the Act of Settlement did not come into effect until 
8. 2 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 559-64 (1923). 
9. H. L. JouR. vol. 4, pp. 130, 132. See generally W. H. BRYSON, EQUITY SIDE OF 
THE EXCHEQUER 52-57 (1975). 
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the death of Queen Anne in 1714.10 
But even in 1714 it could not have been said that the English 
judges held by life tenure be-:!ause their offices expired when a king 
died and reappointment was not required. George I did not reappoint 
Baron Banastre in 1714. It was not until 1760 that a statute was passed 
which declared that judicial appointments did not expire upon the 
death of the monarch.11 
Security of judicial tenure, however, is but a partial solution to 
the availability of impartial justice. Throughout the seventeenth cen-
tury, a special royal commission of oyer and terminer could set up 
a hand-picked court to try and convict a special prisoner. These special 
commissions included laymen as well as judges, and if it were thought 
necessary for a conviction, the laymen could outnumber the profes-
sionals. This method of manipulating justice was used regularly from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Some of the more prominent 
defendants before these special courts were Sir Thomas More (1535), 
Sir Nicholas Throckmorton (1554), Mary Queen of Scots (1586), Sir 
Walter Raleigh (1603), and Guy Fawkes (1606).12 This method of judicial 
selection was still in use in the mid eighteenth century, and several 
of the Jacobite rebels were tried under special commissions in 1746.13 
It was used by the Puritans in 1649 to prosecute John Lilburne. 
Cromwell and the others had dispatched King Charles I by a special 
court created for that purpose, which court was different from special 
commissioners only in name.14 The regicides, in their turn, were con-
victed in 1660 under special commissions.15 
It is stated that "[r]eligious toleration was extended to Protes-
tant denominations" in the period 1640 to 1689. While this is true, 
it was not the result of Calvinist theology or example. It was the 
result of some hard political realities. The Puritans in England and 
in New England were not tolerant of religious dissent as a matter 
of their theology; they were forced to accede to a small measure of 
it only in order to protect themselves from the Roman Catholics and 
the high church Anglicans. 
10. BRYSON. supra note 9, at 56-7. 
11. BRYSON. supra note 9, at 59-61. 
12. 1 COBBETI''S STATE TRIALS 885, 869, 1161, {1809), 2 ld. 1, 159 (1809); 1 J. F. 
STEPHEN,HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 337 (1883). 
13. Francis Townley, Alexander Kinloch & Charles Kinl~ch: 18 HoWELL'S 
STATE TRIALS 329,395 (1813). William Jackson and others were tried for murder in 1749 
under special commissions of oyer and terminer: 18 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1069 (1813). 
14. 4 COBBETT'S STATE TRIALS 1269, 989 (1809). 
15. 5 COBBETT'S STATE TRIALS 947 (1810). 
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Professor Berman is quite correct in saying that some of the 
"[r]oyal powers were limited by a written Bill of Rights." But this 
was not a new concept. Royal powers of the English monarchy had 
been limited by Magna Carta (1215), the Statute of Marlborough (1267), 
and the Confirmatio Cartarum (1297).16 
Other chronological errors slip into the argument. The privilege 
against self-incrimination, for example, was allowed in the days of Good 
Queen Bess.17 The jury had ceased to be "an active investigatory body" 
in the sixteenth century or earlier.18 Written pleading was introduced 
into civil litigation in the early part of the sixteenth century .19 Also, 
the fictions of the actions of ejectment and trover that enabled the 
court of king's bench to capture much of the business of the court 
of common pleas were developed well before the dawn of the seven-
teenth century.20 
I disagree also as to the holding of the case of Paradine v. Jane.21 
This case did not establish any rule of contract law but was a case 
involving property rights; the lessee was liable for the rent because 
he had conveyed it to the lessor, and any theory of failure of con-
sideration was irrelevant. This strikes me as a backward looking and 
medieval case. The modern view, which is not even today fully 
accepted by the legal profession and the courts, is that a lease agree-
ment is a bilateral contract and not two independent conveyances.22 
The most significant legal change in the seventeenth century was 
the abolition of tenure by knight's service, tenure in capite, and its 
feudal incidents in 1660. However, this was almost accomplished in 
the early years of the reign of James I. The so-called Great Contract 
with the king would have re-organized the finances of the Crown and 
16. The Petition of Right (1641), 4 H. L. JouR. 130, 132, and the Bill of Rights 
(1688), 1 W. & M. (1688], sess. 2, ch. 2, 6 STAT. REALM 142-45, were anticipated by Magna 
Carta (1215), 1 STAT. REALM 9-13, the Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. III [1267], 1 STAT. 
REALM 19-25, and the Confirmatio Cartarum (1297), 25 Edw. I [1297], 1 STAT. REALM, 123-24. 
17. E.g., Fenton v. Blomer, P.R.O., C. 33/61, f. 66 (Ch. 1580); Anon., 3 Leonard 
204, 74 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ex. 1588); Cary and Cottington v. Mildmay, Tothill 7, 21 Eng. 
Rep. 107 (Ch. 1590); Vice-Countess Montague v. Anon., Cary 9, 21 Eng. Rep. 5 (Ch. 
temp. Eliz. 1). 
18. J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 65-6 (1979). 
19. BAKER, supra note 18, at 71-72. 
20. BAKER, supra note 18, at 254-55, 332-34. 
21. Style 47, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 519, 897 (K.B. 1648). I thus do not agree 
with Prof. Simpson's characterization of this case as expounded in A. W. B. SIMPSON, 
A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 32-33, 529-32 (1975). 
22. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.103, 9.41 (1952). 
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abolished the rights of wardship, marriage, and purveyance, which 
were medieval shackles upon real property, but political negotiations 
broke down. By the end of 1607, both king and Parliament had become 
wary of the proposal, and it was put on the shelf.23 
One could cavil further, but this is sufficient to demonstrate that 
almost all of the progress of the law of the seventeenth century had 
significant legal antecedents and that what happened in the century 
of Hale and Nottingham was but a part of the slow but steady evolu-
tion of the English law and civilization.2' 
Professor Berman writes "[a]ll our modern Western legal systems, 
including the English, have their origins in violent revolutions, ... " 
This is not true of Anglo-American law. Violent revolution is the op-
posite of the rule of law. Inter arma silent leges. War is violence not 
law or reason; violence is hatred and cruelty. Revolution is, moreover, 
usually followed by counter-revolution. Cromwell turned out to be an 
undemocratic dictator. The repressive Bourbon monarchy was restored 
to France after the brutal Terror of the French Revolution. Stalin 
was Ivan the Terrible writ large. Professor Berman's suggestion that 
revolution be given any credit for the development of the law is un-
fortunate; while war may result in some small political gains, it only 
impedes the natural evolution of legal principles and procedures. 
The concept of legal "revolution" is dramatic and exciting; it 
makes for good reading. However, the more closely one studies history, 
and particularly legal history, the more it appears that the law and 
its development is enormously complicated and subtle. The law seems 
to be very wary of change and seems always to be holding back to 
see if the political and social revolutions are valid, and, if so, then 
the law will change a little in response. The political revolutionaries, 
of course, try to use law as a tool, but somehow the schemes for 
reform founder unless they are based on some widely-shared, long-
debated, ancient idea. The law is not as tractable a tool as a gun or 
a knife, nor is it so brutal. The law is persuasion rather than force. 
Revolution is barbarism; law is civilization. 
However, Professor Berman does not stop with these opinions 
on revolution but goes on to discuss with approval the career of Sir 
Matthew Hale, who was a moderate puritan (or maybe he was a 
23. KENYON, supra note 4, at 65-68. 
24. B. Shapiro, Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England, 19 AM. JouR. 
LEGAL HIST. 280, esp. 310-11 (1975). 
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moderate Anglican). Hale studied theology in his spare time but re-
mained above sectarian quibbling and intolerance. Hale was intellec-
tually honest in his religion, in the administration of the law, and in 
the living of his life. Although I do not see any connection between 
Hale's moderate religion and his legal philosophy, I do agree with 
Professor Berman's opinion that Hale "asserted the independent validi-
ty of English law as such, which evolved in the first instance through 
experience, through wisdom and usage, and which was suited to the 
character of the English people." I also agree with Hale. The growth 
of the law has been by small steps taken slowly, by trial and error, 
by decisions agreed upon after lengthy debate. Those revolutionaries 
who were most strident in their criticism of the law, who would 
discard the old and compose new law, who would make the law "con-
cise" and "understandable" were usually those people who were the 
most ignorant of the law. After the radicals have spent their fury, 
the law resumes its original shape and continues its course of growth 
by evolution. England was fortunate in that the ignorance that would 
have abolished the Court of Chancery in the mid seventeenth cen-
tury was smothered by the Hale Commission of 1651. The Hale Com-
mission built on ideas which had been discussed before and would 
be discussed again, long after the Restoration of the Stuarts. 
Professor Berman's absorbing Lecture ends with the thought that 
revolutions represent "both a break with that tradition and a renewal 
of it." And indeed when revolutions attempt to break up traditions, 
the underlying legal system renews those good parts of the old legal 
ways of our getting along with each other, legal traditions which the 
revolutionaries in their impatient zeal failed to appreciate. 

